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ABSTRACT: The simplest statement of the relationship between consensus and dissensus is that arguments
are supposed to begin in dissensus and end in consensus. This essay introduces a third state for
argumentation, learned ignorance. Nicolas of Cusa’s De Docta Ignorantia (1440) lays out both a case and a
logic for argumentation that is not designed to end in a clear conclusion. Instead, the arguer pursues a
matter up to an inconclusive point, and ends there, satisfied with the results. The underlying logic of this
view is centered on the “coincidence of opposites,” which requires rejection of the usual logical principle
that A and not-A cannot both be true.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In theorizing argumentation, scholars have worked out several theories of stasis, which is
a “resting point” or critical issue whose resolution will decisively turn the argument
toward one conclusion or another. These stases are all internal to the argument in the
sense that they refer to different points along an argument’s trajectory. When we analyze
the beginning and ending states of arguments, however, our literature seems to admit only
two theoretically interesting circumstances, consensus and dissensus. The aim of this
essay is to nominate a third such state, learned ignorance, to scholarly attention.
In developing this theme, I will begin by examining common views of consensus
and dissensus, and then move on to learned ignorance, an idea championed in Nicholas of
Cusa’s De Docta Ignorantia (1440), a treatise of mystical theology. In the final section of
the essay, I will attempt to move his theological position into the more mundane world of
everyday arguing.
2. CONSENSUS AND DISSENSUS
Some theorists explicitly propose, and far more scholars tacitly assume, that the purpose
and natural course of good argumentation is to achieve consensus among the disputing
parties. Arguments need to begin on ground common to the arguers, of course. They need
to share various factual understandings of the world, must have a common language, and
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need to have some way of cooperatively connecting their general values and
understandings of what counts as an acceptable argument (Brockriede 1975; Fogelin
2005). While obviously important, these agreements on starting points are not ordinarily
what is meant by consensus, as I use the term here.
Instead, consensus is held out as the desired end state of a successful argument, a
final agreement on the main point of dispute. It is displayed as free and mutual
endorsement of the whole argument’s conclusion. This endorsement is expected to be the
outcome of working through the various supporting ideas for that conclusion, and so
consensus also involves acceptance by at least one party of matters that were not
originally congenial. In our community, we concentrate on adherence to the content of
the arguments rather than their emotional or sociological surround, although there are
some welcome expansions of that focus (e.g., Gilbert 1997).
In certain theories, this commitment to consensus is explicit (e.g., van Eemeren &
Grootendorst 1983; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969). Implicit commitment is
apparent in the many conceptualizations of argumentation’s purpose: to persuade, to
enhance knowledge, or to promote democracy, for instance. These outcomes only occur
in the face of new adherence. But perhaps most revealing of all is how we describe
arguments that fail to end in consensus (and we know that this is true of many everyday
arguments; Vuchinich 1990). We call them “unresolved.” This linguistically marked term
means that the argument is incomplete or deficient. Occasionally, as with Vuchinich, we
are comfortable with this outcome; more often, as with Trapp and Hoff (1985), we worry
about the consequences of being unresolved. But we always notice that the argument has
not run its theoretically proper course, and is in some important way unfinished. The aim
of argument, its desired end state, is understood to be consensus.
Dissensus, in contrast, is usually regarded as a beginning status for arguing, in
fact the very state that brings an argument into existence. Arguments begin in
disagreement (O’Keefe 1977) or doubt (Peirce 1980) or in a question (Meyer 1995).
Arguments are normally regarded as tools for managing ignorance, uncertainty, or
conflict. Even when they have other purposes, such as play or identity display, they take
their form and procedure from the prototype, which is an argument designed to be
“resolved.” We usually think of argument as a way of bridging the human gap between
dissensus and consensus. So arguments are considered to begin in dissensus.
Several scholars, however, have suggested that dissensus is also a productive
closing state for an argument. Willard’s (1986) classic essay, “Valuing Dissensus,”
promoted dissensus as a desirable end for arguing. Dissensus mitigates against
intellectually coercive homogeneity, it valorizes disagreement, and it establishes a
tolerant open-minded context for important public debate. Hynes (1991) proposed that
organizations reconfigure themselves to reduce their inevitable desire for conformity, in
favour of institutionalizing dissensus of high quality. Both Willard and Hynes wrote as
though the real value of dissensus is that it will eventually lead to better arguments and
thus to better consensus. But we can see that in a particular instance, it might well be
desirable to create dissensus out of harmony, to jolt people into examining their
assumptions and easy agreements. Even if dissensus is only taken to be a temporary
resting place for an ongoing controversy, Willard and Hynes see it as a perfectly
appropriate ending state for a particular argument.
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So we normally theorize the beginning stage of argumentation as dissensus. Most
often we consider that its point is to achieve consensus at the end. These two conditions
have produced valuable theory. However, there may also be a third way, learned
ignorance. In the following section, I will summarize this argumentative status in hopes
of showing that it may well justify scholarly attention as an alternative end state.
3. LEARNED IGNORANCE
Nicholas of Cusa (1401—1464) was a prominent churchman of his time. He was
eventually a Cardinal, and spent an active career as a church diplomat and participant in
key governance disputes, such as the disagreement over the relative authority of the Pope
and church councils conducted at the Council of Basel (1431-1449). Not unused to
practical matters, he once had the ignominy of having to surrender in an armed conflict
over whether he or a secular prince should have control of Cusa’s bishopric. He was well
educated, and received a doctorate in canon law early in his career. He often did legal
work for Rome. His written works included sermons and treatises on a variety of
subjects. He has been consistently read, reprinted, and translated throughout the centuries,
and Cusanus societies in several countries are active in the academy. Perhaps his most
famous work is De Docta Ignorantia (On Learned Ignorance, 1440), a treatise of
mystical theology. This book will be my focus here. Bond’s (1997) introduction to the
volume is useful in summarizing it and putting it into context with Cusa’s other
theological writings.
Perhaps it will be most helpful to start at the end, with book III. Several Christian
theological matters are, on their face, mysterious. For example, Christ is held to be both
human and divine. Surely these are contradictories, and both terms cannot simultaneously
describe the same person or thing. Humans are born and die, for instance, but the divine
is eternal, without beginning or end. Another example is the Trinity. God is three
Persons, and also one. But obviously three is greater than one, and so different from it.
Three persons cannot also be one person. These and other matters fundamental to
Christianity involve prima facie contradictions, and our unaided reason recoils at them.
Cusa set out to create a theology, a system of reasoning, that resolves these apparent
contradictions.
His basic principle is called the “coincidence of opposites.” Here, coincidence
does not mean happenstance; it means that two things, opposite things, coexist in
intellectual peace, without friction, distinction, or contradiction, with equal truth and
force. Among the opposites he has in mind are those mentioned just above, human/divine
and three/one.
Permitting contraries to coexist without opposition violates logic’s law of
contradiction, to wit, A and not-A cannot both be true. Cusa was entirely aware of this.
On learning that his treatise had received criticism, he wrote Apologia Doctae
Ignorantiae (A Defense of Learned Ignorance, 1449), and there he said,
But when he [the critic, John Wenck] alleges that both the fundamental principle-of-knowledge
(which is enfolded in the principle ‘every thing either is or is not [the case]’) and all inference are
destroyed, he is misconceiving. For he fails to notice that learned ignorance is concerned with the
mind’s eye and with apprehension-by-the-intellect (intellectibilitas)—so that whoever is led to the
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point of seeing ceases from all discursive reasoning, and his evidence comes from sight. (14; the
first editorial insertion is mine, the others are Hopkins’)

On confronting mysteries that cannot be resolved by logic or discursive reasoning, Cusa
recommended that we abandon logic and discourse in favour of direct spiritual sight. This
gaze can only be directed once logic is exhausted. Intellectibilitas is the last thing one
achieves, not the first.
Learned ignorance is a hard-won state. One pursues enlightenment with reason as
far as reason will go. In theology, however, one eventually encounters matters that human
reason will not resolve, and so there we must be guided by the intellect, our spiritual
intelligence. Letting go of reason requires the embrace of learned ignorance, which is a
modest condition. It means “to know that we do not know” (De Docta Ignorantia, I.i.4).
He concluded the first of De Docta Ignorantia’s three books by writing, “. . . the precise
truth shines forth incomprehensibly in the darkness of our ignorance. This is the learned
ignorance for which we have been searching . . .” (I.xxvi.89).
In the Apologia Cusa displayed awareness that this general idea had been
proposed by others, including Socrates, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, and Augustine
(for connections between Cusa’s work and the prior work of Pseudo-Dionysius, John
Scottus Eriugena, and Meister Eckhart, see Duclow, 2006). But his development is
independent of those earlier writers, and has its own special force and coherence. I will
try to sketch the outline of his thinking here.
Centuries before the invention of calculus, Cusa was deeply involved in thinking
about limits and infinity, and did so in mathematical terms (De Docta Ignorantia, I.xi.30I.xxiii.73). He chose geometry as an entrée into the nature of God because mathematics
uses abstract symbols, and so is already somewhat purified in the sense that manipulation
of the symbols involves only the use of reason. In these passages, he considered the line,
the triangle, the circle, and the sphere. His key move was to contemplate the natures of an
infinite line, infinite triangle, infinite circle, and infinite sphere. His explanations of why
all these infinite constructions are equivalent to an infinite line really deserve to be read
for themselves, but I will summarize his argument about infinite circles here (I.xiii).
A finite circle has a center, a diameter, and a circumference. Along the
circumference, we can cut arcs to examine. In a circle with a small diameter, say a few
inches, such an arc is obviously and definitely curved. If the diameter increases to a foot,
we can still perceive the curve but it is less dramatic than for the smaller circle. A circle
with a diameter of a few miles would also produce a curved arc, of course, but it appears
less curved, thus straighter, than those of the smaller circles. Any finite circle yields
curved arcs, but as the diameter and circumference increase, the arc becomes straighter
and straighter. So Cusa reasoned that the limit for a circle’s arc is a straight line. For an
infinite circle—one with infinite diameter and infinite circumference—the line defining
its arcs and circumference is therefore an infinite line. Thus an infinite circle is an infinite
line. This infinite line is simultaneously the infinite circle’s circumference, diameter, and
center. Cusa offered similar explanations for why an infinite triangle is an infinite line,
and why an infinite sphere is, too.
He took one further important step, arguing that there can only ultimately be one
infinite line, the maximum infinite line. If there were two or more they would be
numbered, distinct, and so conceivably comparable, all of which he said is conceptually
impossible in the realm of the infinite. They would, if they existed, resolve themselves
4
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into the one maximum infinite line. The infinite line, after all, is not an actual thing and
so should not be expected to have the properties of finite lines.
Before moving on to other details of Cusa’s theological system, let us pause to
notice an important thing. Infinite triangles, infinite circles, and infinite spheres are all the
same thing, infinite lines. Considered in their infinite, unlimited, ultimate state, these are
not distinct, and so cannot be opposites. They have no relations such as greater and lesser,
cause and effect, basic and constructed. They coexist in a coincidence of opposites. (This
last is a questionable sentence. “Coexist” is not quite the right word because it implies
that two distinct things are present, and a similar objection can be laid against “they.”
Infinity is just infinity, in Cusa’s thinking.) The fact that neither a finite triangle nor a
finite sphere seems to be a straight line is just an indication that human reason can only
lead us so far. Reason takes us right up to the limits of finitude. After that, we must place
ourselves in a state of learned ignorance.
This sort of reasoning—he understood the geometrical arguments to be
transumptive, or analogical—led Cusa to the conclusion that there is one absolute
maximum, which is God. This is where all the infinities we can conceive are collected
into their common essence: the maximum line, the perfect human, anything that is
purified to its infinite, eternal nature. He said that the maximum is “the absolute one that
is all things” (I.ii.5). The infinite, absolute maximum is the beginning and end. It can be
contracted (i.e., projected or realized in a particularized way) to “being,” and being is
necessary for both being and not-being (I.vi). So being and not-being are another
coincidence of opposites. He was explicit about how this differs from ordinary
understandings of knowledge:
[…] it is necessary to reject things that, along with their material accessories, are attained through
the senses, the imagination, or reason, in order to reach the most simple and most abstract
understanding, where all things are one; where the line is a triangle, a circle, and a sphere; where
unity is trinity and trinity is unity; where accident is substance; where body is spirit and motion is
rest, and so on. (I.viii.27)

The absolute maximum is “where all things are one.” It is God, of course, eternal and
unavailable to interrogation by logic or the senses. Learned ignorance is the means by
which faith, allied with reason but finally independent of reason, can join a believer into
this eternal union.
Since our interests are not essentially theological, I will pass over Cusa’s
explanation of how the universe is a contracted unfolding of the absolute maximum (II),
as well as his detailed discussion of Christian theological mysteries (III). Instead, I will
only take note of Cusa’s remarks concerning the implications of the coincidence of
opposites for some specific argument schemes. Then we will pass into the final section of
the paper, where I try to apply these principles to ordinary arguing.
Cusa’s treatise is itself closely argued, and he made no objections to the use of
logic and ordinary argument schemes for working out finite matters. However, on
confronting questions dealing with the absolute maximum, many sorts of argument must
be abandoned. The most fundamental sort of inadmissible argument is that from
opposites, of course, since there are no opposites in the absolute maximum. This thesis
has implications for other argumentative tools as well.
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In the absolute maximum, no distinctions remain. Everything coexists in the
coincidence of opposites. Let me summarize how Cusa expanded this idea in various
comments that we would construe as being about argument schemes.
 Since there are no distinctions, naming is inappropriate (I.v.13), especially in
the case of God (I.xxiv.76). To name a thing is to separate it from everything
with a different name, and that presupposes distinction.
 Number also requires distinction, and it further implies the possibility of
quantitative comparison (I.v.13). Nothing can be counted in the infinite realm.
It is even wrong to speak of the infinite as being unity, because once the idea
of one has been introduced, that implies the possibilities of two and three,
which make no sense in the absolute maximum.
 Arguments about proportion, making use of relations such as greater and
lesser, require number and so are nonsensical (I.iii.9). Nothing in the absolute
maximum is greater or lesser than another thing because nothing is
distinguished. Thus the absolute maximum is also the absolute minimum, a
point Cusa repeated often in the book.
 Cause and effect also presume separation or otherness (I.vii.20). The
connection between the two things is prior to their causal relation, and that
connection is unity. So connection is “prior” to causality, and connection is
eternal.
From Cusa’s point of view, loss of these argumentative resources was no inconvenience,
because at the absolute maximum we cease to reason anyway. Instead, we must try to
embrace learned ignorance. De Docta Ignorantia ends with this personal note:
[…] by what I believe was a celestial gift from the Father of Lights […] I was led to embrace
incomprehensibles incomprehensibly in learned ignorance, by transcending those incorruptible
truths that can be humanly known” (III.263).

4. LEARNED IGNORANCE IN THE MUNDANE WORLD
In this last section of the essay, I want to explore how Cusa’s ideas about theological
argument might apply to ordinary discourse. Two ideas in particular seem worth thinking
about: transcendence and learned ignorance.
The coincidence of opposites is a doctrine that transcends differences. For Cusa,
the transcendence is accomplished when all distinctions disappear and one arrives at
direct spiritual sight of a unity that cannot be named or described in discourse. I do not
propose we aim for that sort of outcome in everyday argumentation, but something
similar has long been noticed as useful. The main difference between mundane
transcendence and Cusa’s is that we ordinarily strive to transcend differences by arriving
at an articulable synthesis of what originally appeared to be distinct things.
In a basic sense, most arguments aim to join ideas together in a new way. The
New Rhetoric (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969) laid out four main types of argument:
quasi-logical arguments, those based on the structure of reality, those establishing the
structure of reality, and dissociative arguments. The last type takes a single idea and
shows that it is really two or more things. The others, however, create a transcending
whole, an argument, out of disparate thoughts: “In the first three chapters [on the first
6
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three kinds of argument] we examined connecting links in argumentation that have the
effect of making interdependent elements that could originally be considered
independent” (p. 411). All arguments except the dissociative ones are transcendent in the
sense that they collect distinctions into unity. This “transcendence of distinction” is a
basic function of argumentation, and justifies our thinking of argument as a transcending
machine.
Argument can also accomplish a more advanced kind of synthesis, one we might
call “transcendence of opposition.” Here the argument does not simply join up things that
were previously unrelated (distinct). It unifies things that were thought to be contraries.
Opposition requires distinction, of course, but it also has contradiction in its essential
character. A and B are distinct; A and not-A are both distinct and opposed.
Burke (1959, p. 337) said that one can transcend disagreement by creating a
vantage point from which the previously opposing terms “cease to be opposites.” Parson
(1993) characterized H. Ross Perot’s public appeals as efforts at transcendence. Perot’s
idea was that as a third party candidate, his presidency would transcend the
Republican/Democrat opposition that he felt prevented public progress.
Current headlines might be read as offering another example. One element held to
have caused the present economic crisis is the set of economic motivations allowed to
operate in the financial markets. Consumers tried to profit by taking mortgages they
could only pay if home equity increased and they were able to flip their houses. Lenders
made those loans in hopes of quick profit, depending on market forces to reinforce the
loans’ reliability. Mortgages were bundled, sold, and insured, so that the risks were
moved away from the lender, in the same way that a bookie lays off bets when they
become unbalanced. Once the financial crisis occurred, the same profit motivations
prevented money from moving around. Lenders had so little liquidity that they could not
afford to take further risks, and few were willing to buy instruments from financial
institutions to supply those companies with sufficient liquidity. So the many but opposed
motives—each centering on self-profit—froze the operation of the financial sector.
Rather than change any of those motives, the current U.S. administration can be
viewed as trying to transcend them. The idea is to discipline the market by regulation, so
that the previously opposing motives are made irrelevant in the sense that everyone will
operate comfortably in a more regulated economy. These are “new rules of the game,”
needed because “[m]arket discipline failed to constrain dangerous levels of risk-taking
through the financial system” (Geithner 2009).
This crisis has made clear that certain large, interconnected firms and markets need to be under a
more consistent, and more conservative regulatory regime. These standards cannot simply address
the soundness of individual institutions, but must also ensure the stability of the system itself.
(Geithner 2009)

In other words, the motivating arguments of individual institutions are to be transcended
by arguments about the whole financial system. The proposed regulations are intended to
affect local decisions by setting aside private aims in favor of an overriding concern for
“the stability of the system itself.” Both Geithner’s argument and the policies it supports
are designed to transcend the variety of often-opposed individual motives in favor of one
common financial motive.
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How, exactly, does transcendence of opposites work? Superficially, what seems to
be needed is an idea that is somehow higher, perhaps more abstract, than the opposing
ones. In fact, transcendence of opposites seems to function by discovering a lower, more
basic thing. A simple example of this is Sherif’s (1958) classic study of intergroup
hostility. Working with boys at camp, he formed two distinct groups and stimulated
considerable hostility between them, evidenced by sharp in-group/out-group prejudice.
Then he created what he called “superordinate goals,” which required the two groups to
work together to achieve some jointly-desired end, for instance, pulling a truck out of the
mud so groceries could be bought and the boys could have lunch. Repeated exposure to
these superordinate goal tasks brought the groups together and eventually erased the
earlier hostilities and group identifications.
Cusa often remarked that the absolute maximum is also the absolute minimum,
and illustrated this once by saying that “being” is necessary for both being and not-being.
“Being” is not more abstract than being and not-being; it is fundamental to both ideas. To
sum up our examples in these terms, we would say that superordinate goals wash out ingroup motivations, that a stable financial system is a value that subordinates private
desires, and that a third party President can operate on the ground common to both major
political parties. Transcendence of opposites, then, seems to be a moving downward
conceptually, a search for common assumptions and ideas basic to both halves of the
opposition. A transcendent thought permits the coincidence of opposites.
Cusa’s second possible lesson for us is the one with which this paper began,
learned ignorance. I argue that it can be a stable ending point for disagreement, a kind of
argument resolution, though not one that has attracted much study. To illustrate the nature
of mundane learned ignorance, let me begin by pointing out some things that are not
learned ignorance.
First, it is not a state of avoidance. Simply refusing to engage a spouse’s request
to paint the living room is not learned ignorance. Avoidance is not even an argument.
Walking away does not normally settle anything, though it might permit a disagreement
to evaporate due its inherent lightness. Avoided arguments are “unresolved,” in our usual
terminology.
Second, learned ignorance is not, as the aphorism has it, “agreeing to disagree.”
This interpersonal status leaves the disagreement intact. It is merely a polite way of
declining to talk about something. Here, too, the argument is “unresolved” and deficient
in some way.
Instead, learned ignorance is the state of having satisfied oneself that an argument
is inherently incapable of being resolved by human reason. An example of this is how
Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson (1967) dealt with paradoxes derived from problems of
logical type. A classic example is the liar’s paradox: “I am lying.” The statement is true if
it is false, and false if it is true. Working at this level, the paradox is irresolvable. Only by
understanding the distinction between a statement and a statement about a statement can
one pass through the fallacy. But this understanding does not generate a solution to the
question, Is this true or false? The advanced comprehension of logical types does not
settle the original issue; it makes the question go away. This is an example of learned
ignorance.
Besides the especially clear example of paradox, we can find ordinary situations
that resemble it. A theist and atheist may have such contradictory commitment stores that
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no way can be found to resolve their disagreement. We should state this even more
strongly: their argument is inherently unavailable to joint rational solution. A biologist
might find no way to establish a connection to the views of a Creationist who believes
that God laid fossils in the earth’s crust. A Democrat might find every conciliatory
remark made by a Republican to constitute proof of an effort to manipulate.
At one level, we might express frustration that the arguments are not resolved. At
a higher level, accompanied by the further reasoning required for a state of learned
ignorance, we might realize that each argument is impermeable to reason in its own
terms, and take satisfaction in drawing that stable, reasoned conclusion. This would not
be a conclusion to the argument; it would be a conclusion about the argument. It would
transcend ordinary reasoning, in approximately the way Cusa described. The danger is in
coming to that ending point prematurely, and giving up on real opportunities for
argumentation. But the possibility of bad judgment is not an indictment of the concept of
learned ignorance.
Learned ignorance, then, is a settled state of argument, akin to consensus and
dissensus but not to being “unresolved.” We achieve this state when we realize that the
argument before us cannot be settled, given our mutual commitment stores and capacity
to reason. Learned ignorance is not disappointment or avoidance. It is a satisfying
inability to resolve an argument on its original terms.
Link to commentary
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